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Abstract 
The Finnish government implemented a temporary exemption of employer social 
insurance contributions for the employers that are located in high unemployment areas 
in the Northern Finland. The payroll tax exemption was designed as an experiment that 
aimed to evaluate employment effects of a regional payroll tax reduction. As a result of 
the experiment payroll taxes were reduced by 3 – 6 percentage points for three years 
beginning in January 2003.   
In this paper we evaluate the employment and wage effects of this regionally targeted 
payroll tax reduction. We compare the employment and wage changes in the target 
region to the employment and wage changes in a control region that has similar 
unemployment rate and similar industry structure than the target region. As finding 
exactly similar control regions is not possible, we adopt a matching procedure by 
choosing, for each firm in the target region, a matched pair from the control region. We 
perform propensity score matching and use the estimated propensities as balancing 
scores to create a control group of firms that is similar to the treatment group in all the 
observable pre-treatment characteristics. We then estimate the effect of the payroll tax 
reduction using difference-in-differences estimators, essentially comparing employment 
and wage changes between the matched pairs after the start of the experiment. We 
report results from both nearest neighbour and kernel matched comparison groups. 
To enhance the transparency of the evaluation we have created the matched firm pairs 
from the plant database of Statistics Finland and designed and published the evaluation 
method before any data on employment or wage outcomes were available in January 
2004. We will follow the employment change of the selected firms based on annual tax 
reports that will be available in March 2004. Detailed information on the wage 
responses will be added to the report in May 2004 based on the payroll data of the 
members of Employers Federation of the Service Industries. 
Keywords: Payroll tax, Labour demand, Tax incidence, Propensity score matching 
JEL-Code: J18, J23, J38, J58, J65, J68 
                                                 
# Government Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland, ossi.korkeamaki@vatt.fi 
∗ Labour Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland, roope.uusitalo@labour.fi 1  Introduction 
Cutting payroll taxes has become a standard proposal to promote employment. For 
example, in Employment Outlook 2003 the OECD suggests targeted payroll tax cuts for 
the groups that are in the weakest position in the labour market. Typical target groups 
are low-wage workers, youth, disabled and long-term unemployed. Regional 
employment subsidies or tax reductions targeted in the high unemployment regions 
have also been used, for example, in Norway and Sweden, and from the beginning on 
2003 in Northern Finland.   
A reduction of payroll taxes lowers the costs of labour and hence boosts the demand of 
labour. However, the positive employment effect crucially depends on the incidence of 
payroll taxes. If the tax cut leads to higher wages that offset the reduction in taxes, tax 
cut has no effect on employment. 
Past evidence on the incidence of payroll taxes is mixed. Studies that rely in time-series 
or cross-country variation in national payroll tax produce widely varying estimates of 
tax incidence. An important problem in such approaches is omitted variables bias. In 
time-series studies, there may be simultaneous changes in other variables that determine 
wages. In cross-country studies it is difficult to control for the differences in wage-
setting institutions and other factors that may be correlated with the level of taxation 
and employment. More promising approach for evaluating the effects of payroll taxes is 
to examine changes in the cost of various mandated employer benefits that vary across 
firms over time or, for example, across the states in the US. Prime examples of such 
studies include Bohm and Lind (1993) who evaluate employment effects of regional 
wage subsidies in Northern Sweden, Gruber (1994) who evaluates the effects of 
mandated maternity benefits in the US, Gruber (1997) who examines the changes the 
changes in pension contributions in Chile, and Johansen and Klette (1998) who examine 
the effects of regionally differentiated payroll taxes in Norway. These studies typically 
find that the changes in the payroll taxes are almost completely shifted into wages with 
little or no employment effects. 
In this paper we evaluate the employment effects of a government program that 
abolished employer contributions to the national pension scheme and to the national 
health insurance system for three years in targeted high unemployment regions. Prior to 
the experiment, these employer contributions varied between 2.95 and 6 percent of 
wages, depending on the capital intensity and the size of the firm. From January 1
st 
2003, all private employers in 20 target municipalities are exempt from these social 
security contributions.   2
The payroll-tax cut was implemented in fourteen municipalities in Northern Finland and 
in six municipalities on islands along the western coast. Targeting the cut in the payroll 
taxes to narrowly defined regions, and the temporary nature of the tax cut, naturally 
limits the extent to which the results can be generalized to potential effects of 
implementing the policy nationwide. First, the payroll tax cuts are financed by increased 
payroll taxes in the rest of the country. In a national scheme the budgetary cost would 
need to be financed by raising other taxes. Second, the regional experiment may have 
substitution effects with labour shifting to target region from the rest of the country. 
This might be beneficial in the sense that one motivation behind the payroll tax cut was 
to boost employment in the disadvantaged regions, but naturally limits the usefulness of 
the results from the experiment in predicting the effects from a national program. Third, 
also the incidence of the tax cut may be different in a regional program since the wages 
are largely determined by national bargaining. However, this point should not be over-
emphasized: firm-level and individual bargaining over wages is important even in the 
centralized bargaining regime. During the period 1992  –  2000 wage drift (i.e. wage 
increases that exceed the union bargains) has been responsible for 38 % of the average 
wage growth. (Piekkola and Marjanen 2003). Finally, a temporary program is likely to 
create smaller employment effects than a permanent reduction in the payroll taxes. 
Three years may not be a sufficiently long period for the firms to adjust their demand 
for labour. On the other hand, many employment contracts in the target region are far 
shorter than three years. For example, seasonal employment in the ski resorts makes up 
a significant fraction of employment in Lapland. It is also possible that the tax 
exemption will be continued after the experimental period. 
Regionally targeted program has also several benefits compared to across the board cut 
in taxes. Perhaps the main benefit for the policy makers is that the effects of a regional 
program are substantially easier to evaluate. The employment change in the target 
region can be compared to similar regions that are not affected by the tax cut. If the 
target and control regions are truly similar, the inferences on the employment effects 
based on comparison on the employment (and wage) changes between the treatment and 
comparison regions provide much more reliable estimates on the effects of the payroll 
tax cut than time-series variation in the payroll-taxes ever could do. 
In this paper we evaluate the effects of the payroll tax cuts by comparing the 
employment changes in the target region to the carefully selected control regions that 
are as similar as possible in terms of unemployment rates, net-migration, industry 
structure and the composition of the labour force. We end up comparing the target 
region in the Northern Finland to a group of municipalities in other high unemployment 
areas in the Northern and Eastern Finland. For the targeted municipalities on islands we 
select comparison group from other similar municipalities on the western coast.   3
Comparison of employment changes across regions still creates problems if the regions 
are not quite similar in all relevant characteristics. For example, an industry-specific 
boom might have different effects in different regions depending on the industry 
structure of the region. To make the treatment and the comparison regions more 
comparable we adopt a matching procedure to identify comparable firms (or rather 
plants) in the treatment and the control regions. By finding each firm in the treatment 
region a twin firm with similar characteristics from the control region, and by including 
only these comparable firms in the control group, we can create a control group that is 
similar in the pre-treatment characteristics. We then evaluate the effects of the payroll 
tax cut by comparing firms that are similar in all observable characteristics. In practice, 
we create the comparison groups by propensity score matching. We use both nearest 
neighbour and kernel-matched comparison groups, and then calculate the effects of the 
tax cut by comparing the employment change in the target firms to the matched 
comparison group. 
2  The experiment 
Payroll taxes in Finland consist of contributions to the Employees’ Pension Scheme, the 
Unemployment Insurance, the National Pension Insurance, the National Health 
Insurance, and the Employment Accident Insurance. The tax rates of various 
components vary across sectors and across the firm size. In 2002, for the private sector 
employers the contribution to the National Health Insurance was 1.69 % and to the 
Employment Accident Insurance 1.00  %. For calculating the National Pension 
Insurance contributions the firms are divided into three categories based on the 
depreciation and the fraction of depreciation of the total payroll. (The intention is to 
support labour intensive firms). The contribution rates in these categories were 1.35, 
3.55 and 4.45. The Unemployment Insurance contributions are progressive, contribution 
rate being 0.7  % of wages for wages up to 840  940 euros and 2.7  % of the wages 
exceeding this threshold. The Employee’s Pension Scheme has a relatively complicated 
fee structure. In large firms the contributions depend on the age of the employees and on 
the number of previous employees receiving early retirement benefits. Smaller firms 
pay a flat rate of 17.32 %. The average total payroll tax rate was 23.86 % in 2002. 
(Statistical Yearbook of the Social Insurance Institution, Finland)    
In March 2002, the Finnish government agreed to a temporary removal of employer 
contributions to the National Pension Scheme and the National Health Insurance. The 
removal of these contributions lowered payroll taxes, depending on the firm size, by, on 
average, 4.1 percentage points in the firms that were located in the four northernmost 
economic regions of Finland and in the firms located on municipalities on islands. The  4
program was designed as an experiment with a stated aim to evaluate the effect of a cut 
in the payroll taxes on employment in the targeted municipalities.  
All private employers and state-owned firms that had a permanent place of business in 
the twenty target municipalities were eligible for the tax exemption. Also private 
households were eligible if the work was done in the target municipalities. The 
maximum annual reduction was 30 000 euros.  Due to restriction in the EU-legislation 
agriculture, fishing, and transport were excluded from the experiment. An important 
restriction is also that municipal employers are not eligible for the exemption
1.  
The payroll-tax exemption will last for three years. It was implemented from the 
January 1
st 2003 and will be in force up to December 2005. Possible extensions after the 
year 2005 will be discussed in conjunction of the government budget proposal for the 
year 2006 in March-April 2005. As the payroll-tax exemption may have anticipatory 
effects, it is useful to note that the regional tax exemption was first suggested by a 
working group that gave its report in December 2001. The law was a part of the 
government budget proposal for the year 2003 that was agreed upon within the 
government in March 2002. The government gave the proposal to the parliament in 
September 2002. The parliament accepted the budget proposal and the president signed 
the law on the payroll-tax exemption in December 2002. 
The estimated number of eligible firms in the government bill was 3  500 and the 
estimated annual budgetary cost of the payroll-tax exemption 8 million euros. The 
experiment was financed by temporarily raising the National Health Insurance 
contributions of the employers outside the target region by 0.014 percentage points. 
All the target municipalities are located in high unemployment areas. However, the 
geographical borders of the target area are somewhat arbitrary. There are other regions 
outside the target area with comparable, or even higher, unemployment rates. The target 
municipalities were selected through a political process and there is no obvious reason 
why just these municipalities were selected. In fact, the original task of the working 
group that proposed the tax exemption was limited to measures that would be targeted 
to only the three northernmost municipalities Inari, Utsjoki and Enontekiö. In their final 
report the working group proposed two alternatives: one involving just these three 
municipalities and one involving also nine other municipalities in Northern Finland. 
                                                 
1 Of all employed in the target region 59.8 % worked in private firms, 40.1 % in the public sector as a 
whole and 28.6 % were municipal employees (same figures at national level were 71.9 %, 28.1 % and 
21.6 %). XX % of employed were excluded due to the exclusion of certain industries, most importantly 
the exclusion of firms producing agricultural products.   5
After the working group rendered its proposal, but before the government gave its 
proposal to the parliament, two more municipalities in Lapland and six municipalities 
on islands were added to the tax exemption region. On the other hand, the working 
group would have granted a tax exemption also to the municipal employers. The final 
proposal was a compromise that excluded all public sector employers with the 
exception of state-owned companies.    
Getting tax exemption was made rather easy for the participating employers. The 
employer had to file a starting declaration to the local tax office. The employers could 
then simply deduct the tax exempt amount from its monthly employer contributions. 
The employers also had to add an attachment to the annual notification listing the wages 
of the employees that were paid within the calendar year and the reductions of social 
security contributions due to the tax exemption. The ease of participation was reflected 
in high take-up rates. By November 2003, 86 percent of the eligible employers with 
more than five employees in 2002 had filed a starting declaration. The fraction of 
participating firms with less than five employees was smaller but more uncertain, 
because not all these firms paid any wages during 2003. 
3  Empirical strategy 
A regionally targeted payroll tax reduction offers better chances to evaluate the 
incidence of payroll taxes and the possible employment effects than across the board 
reduction of employer contributions. The key benefit is that in a regional experiment, 
the wage and employment changes in the eligible firms can be compared to similar 
firms outside the target region. By carefully selecting comparison areas, it is more likely 
that other simultaneous changes in the economic environment have similar effects in the 
treatment and control regions. Instead of simple before – after -comparisons it is 
possible to compare wage and employment changes across target and control regions 
and base the inferences on the difference in differences. 
If the control area is truly similar to the target area, the development in the control area 
can be used as a valid counterfactual estimate of what would have happened in the 
target area in the absence of the payroll-tax reduction. Careful selection of the 
comparison region is a necessary pre-condition for the validity of this assumption. 
While focusing on the employment changes “differences away” pre-existing differences 
across the target and control regions, it is still possible that the target and the control 
regions experience different shocks or display different pre-existing trends in 
employment or wages. In particular, different industrial structure may lead to different 
timing of the business cycle in control and target regions. To minimize the differences  6
between target and comparison regions it is necessary to select into comparison group 
regions that have similar pre-treatment unemployment rates and similar industry-
structure.  
The target area in the payroll tax exemption evaluated in this paper comprises of twenty 
municipalities in high unemployment areas. Even if the tax exemption was introduced 
as an experiment, the target area was definitely not chosen randomly. Rather the payroll 
tax cut was intended to bolster employment in the most disadvantaged areas. The final 
selection of target municipalities was a result of intense political bargaining. Still, it is 
not obvious why just these municipalities were selected. There are other regions with 
comparable or even higher unemployment rates that were excluded from the target 
area
2.     
In this paper we select the control group by a two-stage procedure. We first select 
NUTS 4 -level economic regions that are most comparable to the target region in terms 
of unemployment rates, urbanization, shares of employment in agriculture, 
manufacturing, and services and the fraction of hotels and restaurants of all business 
enterprises. (Compared to the national average the target region is characterized by high 
unemployment, low urbanization, a large agricultural sector and a small manufacturing 
sector. Tourism is a large and growing industry in the target region). We select the 
comparison regions based on data in Seutukunta- ja maakuntakatsaus 2002 by Statistics 
Finland. The six target municipalities on islands are part of several NUTS 4 regions. 
These regions also include major cities in the mainland. We chose to select the 
comparison region for these municipalities from other small municipalities from the 
western coast. 
                                                 
2 The economic region with highest unemployment rate in 2001 was Kehys-Kainuu just south of the 
target region. In fact, proposals of extending payroll tax exemptions to Kainuu are currently being 
discussed.    7
Figure 1.  Target and comparison regions in the Finnish pay-roll tax cut 
experiment 
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We did not follow any formal procedure in selecting the comparison region but made an 
attempt to find regions that are as comparable as possible in all the aspects mentioned 
above. Therefore, we excluded other non-target regions in Lapland because they were 
administrative centres with a large university (Rovaniemi) or major manufacturing cities 
(Kemi-Tornio). Instead, we included areas from Eastern Finland just south of the target 
region where the unemployment rate is high and tourism is an important industry. (See 
the map) Our preliminary judgement is that the choice of comparison areas was rather  8
successful. To minimize the temptation to alter the choice ex-post, we fixed the design 
and published the setup before any data from employment effects became available in 
January 2004. 
To further enhance the comparability of target and comparison regions we took the 
Establishment Register of Statistics Finland and matched each firm in the target area 
with a similar firm in the comparison region. In practice, we first split the data into main 
industries
3 using the classification in the Labour Force Survey and then estimated logit-
models within each industry explaining whether the firm was located in the target 
region. The explanatory variables were the number of employees in 1999, 2000 and 
2001, the total earnings of the employees in 1999, 2000 and 2001, the total sales of the 
firm in 2001 and a three-digit industry code
4. We then found the closest match from the 
comparison region for each firm in the target region using the predicted probability 
from the model. In addition to this nearest neighbour matching, we also estimated 
models where each target firm was matched to five nearest neighbours and a model 
where the control was a weighted average of control firms and the weights were 
determined by the distance in the probabilities according to an Epanechnicov kernel. 
It should be noted that the motivation of the matching approach differs slightly from the 
usual approach used in the program evaluation literature. For example, Deheija and 
Wahba (1999) describe propensity score matching stating that “conditional on the 
propensity score the assignment to treatment is essentially random”. In the case of 
regional programs the location of the firm fully determines the eligibility for the tax 
exemption – there is no randomness. Still by choosing only matched pairs to the 
comparison group the basic features of the matching procedure remain intact. Matching 
guarantees that only firms that are comparable in the observable characteristics are 
compared. No functional form restrictions on the effects of contextual variables are 
required and the analysis can be restricted to “common support” by excluding firms that 
cannot be matched
5. A better description of the matching procedure is that using the 
propensity scores the distributions of the firms in the observable characteristics are 
balanced so that the distribution of observable characteristics is similar in the treatment 
and the control group.             
                                                 
3 In the target and comparison regions we use a classification into 6 main industries at the probability 
estimation stage. Matching is done strictly within a finer industry classification with 20 classes. 
4 The number of employees, total wages and sales were entered in logarithms. 
5 For example, if in some industry there are firms only in the target region, including industry dummies in 
the logit equation predicts ”failure” with certainty. Imposing the common support condition by requiring 
that P (D = 1 | X) < 1 where D = 1 indicates that the firm is located in the target region drops these 
observations from the analysis.   9
As a final note in this section, we discuss the timing of potential effects. The working 
group that proposed the tax cut handed in its report in December 2001. The decision to 
implement the program was effectively made in April 2002 when the government 
decided on the budget for the year 2003. It was also widely discussed in press during the 
spring 2002. It is, therefore, possible that firms who anticipated the tax exemption could 
have altered their employment already before the start of the program in January 2003. 
We examine potential anticipatory effects by basing the matching on data from the end 
of 2001, before any information on the program was made public. We then compare the 
treated and control firms for both the pre-program period from January 2002 to 
December 2002 and for the program period after January 2003.  
The tax exemption was planned to be temporary and to last for three years. In this 
evaluation we will follow the effects during the first two years of the program and 
finalize the analysis in the spring of 2005. By then most firms that will alter their 
employment will probably have done so already. The employment changes during the 
final year of the experiment and the effects of ending of the program will be left for 
later generations of researchers.  
4  Data 
We created the matched data on target and control firms based on data from the Register 
of Enterprises and Establishments of Statistics Finland. This database should ideally 
contain information on every unit that contributes to GNP, but the annual tables that we 
have used are somewhat more restricted in their scope. We have concentrated on private 
sector firms that have had a clearly positive turnover, have paid wages and employed 
someone, and that are within industries eligible for the tax cut. Furthermore, we 
required that the firms have one plant only, so that its location can be determined 
accurately. We found 2 811 (247) such firms in the northern (south coast) target area 
and 7 583 (1 551) firms in the control area. After removing observations with missing 
information on some of the required control and response variables we were left with 
1 513 () firms in the target area and 3 994 () firms in the comparison area. 
Comprehensive data on the employment and earnings outcomes was available from the 
Finnish Tax Administration. The data is based on employer’s annual notification that all 
employers are required to submit to the regional tax office by the end of January 
following the year of payment. The annual notification includes all wages and salaries 
paid during the calendar year. The payments are itemized by employee, and the 
summary form contains the number of recipient itemizations. This number equals the 
number of employees that have received some wages or salaries from the firm during  10
the year. Naturally, the number of itemizations is only a rough measure of the average 
employment in the firm. On the other hand, the total wages and salaries paid (i.e. the 
product of hours worked and the average hourly wage) should be accurately reported.  
The data from the Tax Administration also contains other useful information. The firms 
are classified to different industries according to their main activity. The location is 
reported but only at the firm- not establishment-level. Also, social security contributions 
are reported in detail, including the category that determines the rate of National 
Pension contributions. Exemptions from these contributions due to the experiment are 
also included in the data. 
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Table 1.  Industry distribution of firms and employees in the end of year 2001. 
Firms that qualify for the matching process. 












Industry             
Manufacturing  215  1 031 2 127 653 5 959  10 098
Construction  216  552 1 299 638 2 218  4 938
Trade  525  1 820 4 274 1 229 3 600  8 107
Transport  192 316 827 394 825  2  456
Business services  188  410 1 135 519 1 376  4 116
Other services  144  408 1 224 448 1 237  3 032
All  1 480  4 536 10 886 3 881 15 216  32 747
SF = Statistics Finland supplied man year estimates, TA = Tax Administration supplied numbers that 
tell the total number of employees on payroll over a one year period. 
 






Employees, SF  3.06 3.92  3.68 
Employees, TA  7.36 8.44  8.14 
Wage sum, SF  57 760  80 692  74 361 
Wage sum, TA  58 233  81 200  74 860 
Social security tax 
contributions  2 560  3 469  3 218 
Turnover  465 586  499 826  490 373 
New firms, %  0.13 0.14  0.13 
SF = Statistics Finland supplied man year estimates, TA = Tax 
Administration supplied numbers that tell the total number of employees on 
payroll over a one year period. 
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The main problem in the Tax Administration data is that hours worked or hourly wages 
are not reported. Taxes are determined according to the annual earnings, and for tax 
purposes there is no reason to collect data on more detailed level. Unfortunately, 
estimating the incidence of tax exemption on wages and the labour demand response are 
impossible based on tax data only. However, the tax data provides a reliable estimate on 
whether the payroll tax deduction had an impact of total wages. If total wages increased 
due to the experiment, there must be an effect on either wages or employment. 
In order to estimate the incidence of payroll taxes we, therefore, need more detailed 
information on wages and hours. There is no single database where this information 
could be gathered for all firms. The best source of data appears to be the Wage Survey 
of the Employers Federation of the Service Industries (PT). This survey contains 
individual level data for all the workers in the firms that belong to the Federation. The 
total number of firms is 9 300, in the target area there are XX member firms. Most of 
these firms are small; three quarters have less than twenty employees.  
The PT Wage Survey contains detailed information on monthly wages and hours 
worked in October of each year. In addition, there are a number of background variables 
on the employees including, for example, education, sex, tenure, occupation and 
industry. Since all employees are included in the database, also changes in employment 
at the firm-level can be calculated from the data.    
Finally, aggregate level employment changes in the target region can be computed from 
the Labour Force Survey. These numbers are somewhat imprecise since the number of 
individuals from the target region that end up in the survey sample is rather small. 
5  Results 
In this chapter we first try to persuade the reader that the matching procedure indeed 
does its job in balancing the observables. Then we proceed by presenting the average 
treatment effects on the treated, i.e. difference in differences estimators for both 
employment and wage sum changes in the target and comparison regions of the tax 
experiment, and follow by presenting some further results to clarify and elaborate on the 
main outcome. 
In this chapter we report only results concerning the target and control regions in 
Northern an Eastern Finland (for the time being).  13
5.1  Covariate balancing (or match quality) 
The variables used in the estimation of the propensity score (the probability of being 
located in the target area) should on the one hand include all variables that are relevant 
in determining the probability and that simultaneously affect the response variable(s). 
On the other hand the large sample properties of the eventual treatment effect estimator 
deteriorate as the number of (continuous) explanatory variables in the propensity score 
equation increases. As it is impossible to empirically determine the correct set of 
variables used, we struck a compromise between the number of variables and the 
probability of leaving out some influential covariates and used the following 
explanatory variables in the logit equation: number of employees in 1999, 2000 and 
2001, the total earnings of the employees in 1999, 2000 and 2001, the total sales of the 
firm in 2001 and a three-digit industry code. We made the logit estimation within eight 
main industries; hence the resulting matches are exact up to that level of industry 
categorisation. Our argument is that after being selected from very similar regions in the 
first place, matching industry quite exactly and three year development in both 
employment and wages should be enough to remove systematic differences relevant to 
employment growth between matches. 
Figure 2 depicts the estimated densities of the probability of firms being located in the 
tax experiment's target region for the target region firms and comparison region firms. If 
our focus were on the probability estimation, the results would not be that great. The 
logit model does indeed a rather poor job of discriminating between firms from the 
target and control regions. When the purpose is to match firms however, it is 
encouraging to see that there does not occur any severe common support problem: large 
fraction of the firms from both regions gets an estimated probability in the range from 
0.1 to 0.5. In figures 3 – 6 we have drawn the development of average and aggregate 
employment and wages in the target region firms, all comparison region firms and the 
kernel matched comparison region firms. Two conclusions can be drawn from these 
figures: comparison region firms are on average larger than the target region firms but 
the evolution of averages and aggregates looks very much alike. The size difference is 
nicely removed by matching, but we would be hard pressed to say that the changes over 
time are any more similar in the matched firms than in the group of all comparison 
region firms.  14





























Target region firms Comparison region firms
 
Figure 4.  Development of the mean firm size in the target region firms, comparison 
region and matched comparison region firms. Firms that existed in the 











































Target region Comparison region Kernel matches
Target region Comparison region Kernel matches
 
Lower lines (years 1996 – 2002) are Statistics Finland supplied man year estimates, higher lines (years 
2000 – 2003) graph Tax Administration supplied numbers that tell the total number of employees on 
payroll over a one year period. 
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Figure 5.  Development of the aggregate employment in the target region firms, 
comparison region and matched comparison region firms. Firms that 
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Lower lines (years 1996-2002) are Statistics Finland supplied man year estimates, higher lines graph 
(years 2000 – 2003) Tax Administration supplied numbers that tell the total number of employees on 
payroll over a one year period. 
 
Figure 6.  Development of the mean wage sum in the target region firms, 
comparison region and matched comparison region firms. Firms that 






























Target region Comparison region Kernel matches
  16
Figure 7.  Development of the aggregate wage sum in the target region firms, 
comparison region and matched comparison region firms. Firms that 
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A more analytic way of examining how successful the matching process was, is to draw 
some measures to gauge the difference between the firms in target and control regions 
before and after matching. We have used the one supplied by a Stata procedure by 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003), i.e. a measure of bias in variables before and after matching. 
The bias is calculated as the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-
treated (full or matched) sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average 
of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups (formulae from 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). It should be noted that we have used two measures for 
employment on the years they were available to us, the Statistics Finland supplied man 
year estimate and the total number of persons on a firm's payroll during the observed 
year acquired from the Tax Administration. The number of hours worked would have 
been the ideal measure for our purposes, but unfortunately that information is not 
collected for a majority of small firms. 
The results on covariate balancing are reported in table 3. The differences between the 
firms in the target and control groups are quite small to begin with and matching 
removes most of the existing bias. The matching variables are used as levels, but our 
focus will be on employment and wage sum changes. Therefore we also calculated 
measures of differences in our response variables for the period 2000 – 2001 to see that 
they do not exhibit divergent behaviour. These results are reported in the lower section 
of table 3 and again it is evident that the differences in growth are small between the  17
regions and are further balanced through matching. We do not report match quality with 
respect to industry since the industry distributions are virtually identical down to the 
three digit level. 
Table 3.  Covariate balancing in propensity score matching (kernel matches). 
   Mean     
  Sample Treated Control Bias,  % 
Reduction 
in bias, % 
Variables used in 
matching, in log's         
          
Employment 2001, SF  Unmatched  0.640 0.740 -9.9 
  Matched  0.651 0.669 -1.8 82.2
          
Employment 2000, SF  Unmatched  0.648 0.751 -10.2 
  Matched  0.661 0.678 -1.7 83.2
          
Employment 1999, SF  Unmatched  0.609 0.709 -9.9 
  Matched  0.621 0.638 -1.7 82.7
          
Employment 2001, TA  Unmatched  1.280 1.481 -15.4 
  Matched  1.291 1.358 -5.1 67.2
          
Employment 2000, TA  Unmatched  1.160 1.334 -11.8 
  Matched  1.180 1.210 -2.0 82.7
          
Wage sum 2001, TA  Unmatched  9.438 9.787 -13.9 
  Matched  9.463 9.625 -6.4 53.7
          
Wage sum 2000, TA  Unmatched  9.119 9.373 -8.3 
  Matched  9.165 9.252 -2.8 65.5
          
Wage sum 1999, SF  Unmatched  8.978 9.241 -8.4 
  Matched  9.014 9.118 -3.3 60.4
          
Turnover 2001  Unmatched  11.327 11.095 7.2 
  Matched  11.373 11.282 2.8 61.0
          
Response variables for 2000 – 2001 (not used in matching)    
          
Employment change, # of 
employees  Unmatched  0.663 0.841 -2.5 
  Matched  0.644 0.773 -1.8 27.3
          
Employment change, %  Unmatched  0.188 0.207 -2.4 
  Matched  0.182 0.181 0.2 91.1
          
Wage sum change, €  Unmatched  6 660.1 9 676.2 -6.0 
  Matched  6 729.5 6 562.8 0.3  94.5
          
Wage sum change, %  Unmatched  0.245 0.275 -3.7 
  Matched  0.242 0.245 -0.3 91.0
          
SF = Employment figure supplied by Statistics Finland, estimated man-years. 
TA = Employment figure supplied by Tax Administration, # of employees on payroll over a year. 
 
In addition to kernel matching (Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.05) we also 
employed the nearest neighbour and five nearest neighbours matching methods, with  18
the same bandwidth on the propensity score metric. Covariate balancing results do not 
have qualitative differences; kernel matching seems to perform better than the single 
nearest neighbour method and equally well with the five nearest neighbours method, see 
appendix 1, appendix table 2. 
5.2  Employment and wage sum responses to the regional payroll tax 
experiment 
Our response variables to measure employment growth in the target and control regions 
are the change in the number of employees on firm's payroll over a one year period, 
relative change in employment
6, change in the firm’s total payroll and relative change in 
the total payroll
7. We prefer the changes in the levels variables owing to the fact that 
they tell directly whether the employment grew faster in the target region firms or not. 
Percent changes on the other hand tell, if the target region firms on average grew faster 
or not. (epäselvästi sanottu!) The matching estimator for determining the difference 
between treatment and control region firms is hence a difference-in-differences 
estimator, i.e. we measure the difference in the growth of the target region firms and 
their matched control region firms. This differencing should remove some of the 
unobservable heterogeneity between target region firms and their matches. 
We calculated the employment and wage sum changes for three time periods, 2001 –
 2002 to work as a control case
8, 2002 – 2003 as the main effect, and 2001 – 2003 for 
the sake of getting more robust results. Our main findings are reported in table 4. The 
table contains six rows for each response variable that tell the outcome for each time 
period under investigation. We report the responses for the treated and control regions 
as a whole (row unmatched) and separately for the subset of matched firms (ATT-
weights). The average treatment effect on the treated is then calculated as a difference 
between the treated and control region outcomes. 
                                                 

















This measure is additive and accommodates both births and closures of firms. It is also bounded on the 
closed interval [-2, 2]. 
7 Measured in the same fashion as the relative change in employment. 
8 Payroll tax cut in the target region begun from the beginning of 2003. Therefore there should not be any 
noticeable effect on the previous period, apart from some small anticipatory effect.  19
Table 4.  Average treatment effects on the treated, propensity score estimates. 
Effects significant at the 95 % confidence level are marked with an 
asterisk *.
 9 
   Treated  Controls 
Treatment 
effect on the 
treated 
        
Employment change, # of employees     
        
2001 – 2002  Unmatched  -0.060 -0.188  0.129 
  ATT-weights  -0.080 0.065  -0.145 
        
2002 – 2003  Unmatched  -0.015 -0.023  0.008 
  ATT-weights  -0.010 -0.141  0.131 
        
2001 – 2003  Unmatched  -0.074 -0.211  0.137 
  ATT-weights  -0.090 -0.075 -0.014 
        
Employment change, %     
        
2001 – 2002  Unmatched  0.055 -0.005  0.060 
  ATT-weights  0.046 0.016 0.029 
        
2002 – 2003  Unmatched  -0.200 -0.251  0.051 
  ATT-weights  -0.198 -0.258  0.060* 
        
2001 – 2003  Unmatched  -0.134 -0.244  0.110 
  ATT-weights  -0.141 -0.231  0.090* 
        
Wage sum change, €   
        
2001 – 2002  Unmatched  2 347  1 402  945 
  ATT-weights  2 314  2 275  39 
        
2002 – 2003  Unmatched  2 314  2 665  -351 
  ATT-weights  2 351  1 157  1 193 
        
2001 – 2003  Unmatched  4 661  4 067  594 
  ATT-weights  4 665  3 432  1 233 
        
Wage sum change, %   
        
2001 – 2002  Unmatched  0.084 0.039 0.045 
  ATT-weights  0.075 0.050 0.025 
        
2002 – 2003  Unmatched  -0.156 -0.227  0.071 
  ATT-weights  -0.152 -0.239  0.087* 
        
2001 – 2003  Unmatched  -0.071 -0.173  0.101 
  ATT-weights  -0.077 -0.172  0.095* 
        
 
                                                 
9 These are (our favoured) kernel estimates, estimated using Epanechnicov kernel with a bandwidth of 
0.05 on propensity score metric. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped with 500 replications.  20
Results in table 4 are quite what we expected. 95 % of the firms (80 % of the workers) 
belong to a payroll tax bracket where the reduction in taxes is ~3 % of the wage sum. 
Therefore the employment effect should not be a large one, if distinguishable at all. 
Both measures of treatment effect for the period 2002 – 2003 are positive. The average 
change in the number of employees was 0.131 workers larger in the target region firms 
than in their matched counterparts in the comparison region and the average wage sum 
grew 1 193 euros more in the target region. Neither of these differences is statistically 
significant, both being smaller than their standard deviations. The differences in other 
periods, when measured in number of workers or euros, are insignificant as well. The 
wage sum growth behaves quite nicely tough, the difference being almost zero in the 
2001 – 2002 period and positive in the other two periods. 
Differences in the proportional growth of the number of employees and wage sum tell a 
slightly different story. Treatment effects for the period 2001 – 2002 are insignificant as 
they should be owing to the fact that the experiment started in 2003. The average 
proportional growth in the target region was however, clearly faster in both number of 
employees and wage sum, the difference being 6 to 9.5 percentage points depending on 
variable and time period. These differences are also statistically significant at the 95 % 
confidence level. The results may seem slightly contradictory, i.e. why did the 
proportional growth display a statistically significant average treatment effect on the 
target region firms but average employment or wage sum did not grow. The explanation 
to this is that it was the small firms that contributed to the proportional growth measure 
but as they represent only a quite small share of the total employment and wage sum, 
they did not have a measurable impact on the totals. Another feature that at first sight 
seems suspect, is the fact that on average the firms did not grow, but actually shrank 
quite noticeably (in percentage terms) over the periods 2002 – 2003 and 2001 – 2003. 
This is explained by the fact a considerable fraction (14 %) of the firms that were in the 
sample in 2001 ceased to exist towards the end of 2003. Every firm closure contributes 
a negative growth percent to the average. This makes the proportional growth 
distribution to lean to the left as it is impossible for new firms to enter the matched (or 
unmatched) sample. 
When we dropped the firms that did not pay any wages in 2003 (our indicator for a firm 
closure) and re-estimated the average treatment effects, we did not find any statistically 
significant treatment effects on any of the response variables. These results are reported 
in the appendix 1, appendix table 4. Furthermore, the firms in the sub samples where 
closures were eliminated did on average show positive growth in levels and proportions. 
It seems then that the tax experiment has had little effect otherwise but it may have 
saved some firms, mostly small ones, from exiting. To examine if this indeed is the 
case, we estimated average treatment effects where the response variable is an indicator  21
for firm closure. The results in table 5 show that in the control period 2001 – 2002 the 
exit frequency of firms was identical in the treatment and comparison regions. The 
results also clearly indicate that the firms in the target region exited some three percent 
less frequently during the tax experiment than their matched counterparts in the control 
region. This three percent differential is also statistically significant at the 95  % 
confidence level
10. 
Table 5.  Average treatment effects on the treated, propensity score estimates. 
Effects significant at the 95 % confidence level are marked with an 
asterisk *.
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   Treated  Controls 
Treatment 
effect on the 
treated 
        
Share of firm closures, measured with # of employees    
        
2001 – 2002  Unmatched  0.017 0.023  -0.006 
 ATT-weights  0.018 0.023  -0.005 
        
2002 – 2003  Unmatched  0.117 0.151  -0.033 
 ATT-weights  0.118 0.153  -0.036* 
        
2001 – 2003  Unmatched  0.117 0.151  -0.033 
 ATT-weights  0.118 0.153  -0.036* 
        
Share of firm closures, measured with  wage sum    
        
2001 – 2002  Unmatched  0.016 0.017 0.000 
 ATT-weights  0.017 0.016 0.001 
        
2002 – 2003  Unmatched  0.114 0.140  -0.026 
 ATT-weights  0.114 0.143  -0.029* 
        
2001 – 2003  Unmatched  0.114 0.140  -0.026 
 ATT-weights  0.114 0.143  -0.029* 
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Appendix 
1  Covariate balancing and average treatment effect estimates with 
different matching methods 





    
Number of firms used in propensity 
score estimation 
1 513 3 994 
    
Number of firms used in calculating   
    
Nearest neighbour estimates  1 250 922 
5-nearest neighbours estimates  1 250 2 503 
Kernel estimates  1 250 3 240 
     26
Appendix Table 2.   Covariate balancing with different propensity score matching 
methods. 
        
 
Bias before 
matching  Bias after matching (reduction, %) 
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used in matching) 
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Appendix Table 3.  Average treatment effect on the treated estimators with different 
matching methods. Standard errors in (parenthesis). 
         
 Matching  method 











         
Employment change, # of employees      
         
2001 – 2002  -0.218 -0.092 -0.145  0.030  -0.042 
  (0.2878) (0.2445) (0.2121)  (0.1682)  (0.1400) 
          
2002 – 2003  0.130 0.103 0.131 -0.050  0.140 
  (0.3261) (0.2646) (0.2393)  (0.2718)  (0.2053) 
          
2001 – 2003  -0.087 0.011  -0.014 -0.021  0.098 
  (0.4126) (0.3317) (0.2810)  (0.3014)  (0.2426) 
          
Employment change, %       
          
2001 – 2002  0.027 0.024 0.029  0.001  -0.022 
  (0.0319) (0.0268) (0.0246)  (0.0219)  (0.0178) 
          
2002 – 2003  0.059 0.060 0.060  0.033  0.083 
  (0.0453) (0.0353) (0.0325)  (0.0344)  (0.0264) 
          
2001 – 2003  0.084 0.086 0.090  0.029  0.101 
  (0.0494) (0.0387) (0.0340)  (0.0352)  (0.0269) 
          
Wage sum change, €       
          
2001 – 2002  -502.8 -151.0  39.361  -253.9 436.7 
  (1 632.2)  (1 430.0)  (1 306.0)  (1 254.0)  (971.7) 
          
2002 – 2003  1 905.6  705.0  1 194.0  359.4  53.62 
  (1 561.8)  (1 309.0)  (1 271.9)  (2 392.2)  (1 374.8) 
          
2001 – 2003  1 402.8  554.0  1 233.4  105.5  490.3 
  (2 618.3)  (2 192.4)  (1 931.8)  (2 745.8)  (1 788.1) 
          
Wage sum change, %       
          
2001 – 2002  0.004 0.016 0.025 -0.012  0.003 
  (0.0357) (0.0294) (0.0265)  (0.0241)  (0.0198) 
          
2002 – 2003  0.101 0.089 0.087  0.039  0.055 
  (0.0462) (0.0359) (0.0318)  (0.0365)  (0.0292) 
          
2001 – 2003  0.085 0.082 0.095  0.026  0.052 
  (0.0512) (0.0401) (0.0352)  (0.0374)  (0.0302) 
         
Standard errors for propensity score method are bootstrapped, normal approximated estimates 
from 500 replications; standard errors for covariate matching estimators are heteroskedasticity 
corrected as in Abadie et al. (2001).  28
Appendix Table 4.  Average treatment effect on the treated estimators with different 
matching methods. Standard errors in (parenthesis). Firms that 
had zero employment or wage sum on year 2003 excluded. 
         
 Matching  method 











         
Employment change, # of employees      
         
2001 – 2002  -0.406 -0.208 -0.211  -0.022  -0.032 
  (0.3425) (0.2707) (0.2334)  (0.1818)  (0.1496) 
          
2002 – 2003  0.075 0.050 0.001  0.205  0.017 
  (0.3274) (0.2791) (0.2781)  (0.2782)  (0.2201) 
          
2001 – 2003  -0.331 -0.158 -0.209  0.183  -0.015 
  (0.4341) (0.3482) (0.3396)  (0.3130)  (0.2586) 
          
Employment change, %       
          
2001 – 2002  0.010 0.017 0.019  0.009  0.016 
  (0.0382) (0.0309) (0.0277)  (0.0232)  (0.0191) 
          
2002 – 2003  -0.019 -0.015 -0.012  0.009 0.004 
  (0.0311) (0.0263) (0.0230)  (0.0231)  (0.0192) 
          
2001 – 2003  -0.039 -0.003  0.001  0.020 0.019 
  (0.0367) (0.0323) (0.0280)  (0.0236)  (0.0197) 
          
Wage sum change, €       
          
2001 – 2002  -346.5 259.3  -50.0  156.5  732.7 
  (2 031.1)  (1 660.9)  (1 498.6)  (1 341.2)  (1023.2) 
          
2002 – 2003  1 985.9  1 275.5  338.6  299.9  -1010.4 
  (1 993.8)  (1 541.4)  (1 619.9)  (2 352.3)  (1 409.9) 
          
2001 – 2003  1 639.4  1 534.8  288.6  456.4  -272.7 
  (3 153.2)  (2 480.8)  (2 408.6)  (2 760.0)  (1 855.9) 
          
Wage sum change, %       
          
2001 – 2002  0.019 0.015 0.016  0.008  0.007 
  (0.0379) (0.0307) (0.0273)  (0.0233)  (0.0193) 
          
2002 – 2003  0.032 0.034 0.020  0.031  0.023 
  (0.0349) (0.0286) (0.0252)  (0.0251)  (0.0211) 
          
2001 – 2003  0.037 0.030 0.017  0.031  0.017 
  (0.0421) (0.0340) (0.0308)  (0.0272)  (0.0227) 
         
Standard errors for propensity score method are bootstrapped, normal approximated estimates 
from 500 replications; standard errors for covariate matching estimators are heteroskedasticity 
corrected as in Abadie et al. (2001).  29
Appendix Table 5.  Average treatment effect on the treated estimators with different 
matching methods. Standard errors in (parenthesis). 
         
 Matching  method 











         
Share of firm closures, measured with # of employees     
         
2001 – 2002  -0.000 -0.004 -0.005  0.005  -0.000 
  (0.0071) (0.0056) (0.0049)  (0.0054)  (0.0043) 
          
2002 – 2003  -0.027 -0.038 -0.036  -0.012  -0.021 
  (0.0182) (0.0142) (0.0125  (0.0137)  (0.0107) 
          
2001 – 2003  -0.027 -0.038 -0.036  -0.012  -0.021 
  (0.0182) (0.0142) (0.0125)  (0.0137)  (0.0107) 
          
Share of firm closures, measured with  wage sum     
          
2001 – 2002  0.004 0.000 0.001  0.005  0.003 
  (0.0143) (0.0051) (0.0044)  (0.0048)  (0.0039) 
          
2002 – 2003  -0.021 -0.030 -0.029  -0.008  -0.014 
  (0.0175) (0.0135) (0.0123)  (0.0133 (0.0104 
          
2001 – 2003  -0.021 -0.030 -0.029  -0.011  -0.002 
  (0.0175) (0.0135) (0.0123)  (0.0135)  (0.0108) 
         
Standard errors for propensity score method are bootstrapped, normal approximated estimates 
from 500 replications; standard errors for covariate matching estimators are heteroskedasticity 
corrected as in Abadie et al. (2001). 
 